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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ( 
v . ) RESPONDENTS' PETITION 
FOR REHEARING. 
CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L. ( 
JOHNSON, his wife; FIRST SECURITY Case No. 14225 
BANK OF UTAH, N.A. ; IDEAL ) . 
NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant -Respondents . 
COME NOW the Respondents above named and respectfully 
petition the above entit led Court for a rehearing in the above captioned 
matter. This Petition is based upon the following grounds and reason: 
1. The Supreme Court has erred in reversing the lower Court 's 
ruling by wrongfully ignoring the testimony given by Mr. Johnson on 
direct examination, after he had qualified as an opinion wi tness in 
accordance with prior decis ions of this Court . 
This Petition is based upon and supported by the following 
authori t ies: 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff init iated the instant action against the 
defendants to acquire by eminent domain their property for road 
construction purposes . The ca se was tried before a jury with the 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, presiding. Plaintiff appealed and alleged 
error by the trial court . The Supreme Court reversed the tr ial court after 
examination of the briefs of the part ies and without oral argument. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
The defendants seek a reversal of this Court 's prior ruling 
whereby the lower court ' s judgment was reversed and seeks to have the 
lower court ' s judgment re - ins ta ted and affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS ERRED IN REVERSING THE LOWER 
COURT'S RULING BY WRONGFULLY IGNORING THE TESTIMONY 
GIVEN BY MR. TOHNSON ON DIRECT EXAMINATION, AFTER HE 
HAD QUALIFIED AS AN OPINION WITNESS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
_ 2 _ 
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The crux of this Petition and for the reversal centers on two 
items of testimony given by the landowner at the time of trial. The 
primary point of contention by Appellants is the testimony given by 
Mr. Johnson on cross-examination as follows: (TR. 56) 
"Q. Mr. Johnson, with regard to your estimate of the 
value of the property and of the improvements located on the 
property, you indicated that your estimate was based on your 
life's work. What do you mean by your life's work? Are you 
an appraiser, are you a real estate salesman? 
A. No, I don't think I am a real estate salesman or 
an appraiser. 
Q. Do you consider yourself knowledgeable as far 
as the valuation or appraisal of the property is concerned? 
A . I know what it is worth to me. 
Q. And is that what your testimony is based on, 
Mr. Johnson, is this what the subject property is worth to you? 
A. Yes." 
* The Court, in the majority opinion, singled this testimony out 
and based the reversal solely upon this testimony. In doing so the Court 
erred by completely ignoring the other voluminous testimony of the witness 
which testimony qualifies for admissibility under the prior decisions of 
this Court, including Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch, 
533 P.2d 888, Ut . , April, 1975. 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(See also Salt Lake and U J . P . C o . v s , Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 
90; State Road Commission vs . Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507; 
State Road Commission vs . Sampson, Utah, May 13, 1976); State 
Highway Commission of Mont, vs . Peterson, 328 P.2d 617; State of 
New Mexico vs . Chavez, 80 N.M. 394, 456 P.2d 868; Provo Water 
Users Assn.. vs . Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777). 
After establishing the landowner's itimate knowledge of his 
property and thus qualifying him, as an opinion witness with extensive 
preliminary testimony, Mr. Johnson testified as follows: 
HQ. (By Mr. Wall) Do you, Mr. Johnson, have an 
opinion of the fair market value of your property based on the 
testimony of all of the matters you have told the Court about 
as of March 1, 1974? 
A. The full value? 
Q. Yes, the entire value of the total package, the 
land and total improvements? 
A. A hundred twenty to a $125,000.00. 
Q. What do you base that on? 
A. Well, it is my life's work and it provided me a 
good living. 
Q. Would you have sold it for anything less than 
that? 
- 4 -
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A. No." 
As mentioned above the witness prefaced his above testimony 
with extensive preliminary testimony as revealed by approximately 47 
pages of the transcript of record. (TR. 11-58). Mr. Johnson, 71 years 
of age, testified that the property had been built under his direction, 
and that he had owned and operated or actively participated in the 
operation of the business operated upon said premises for a period of 
approximately 20 years. (TR. 20-24). In addition, it was clearly 
established by the evidence and testimony that the property was unique 
in that it was the only piece of commercial property in the area, having 
predated the zoning ordinance and thus enjoying a "grandfather" zoning 
privilege. (TR. 59, 60, 73, 74). As a result of this unique feature 
none of the witnesses were able to find "comparable sales" in the 
immediate area of the subject property, which fact lends greater 
credibility to the personal, first-hand knowledge of the party responsible 
for the construction of the building and its operation in the area in 
question. 
In view of this unique situation we submit that there is no 
sound, logical basis upon which such testimony can or should be d i s -
credited or ignored. 
When one reviews the total transcript of the record it should be 
- 5 -
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obvious that the testimony of the landowner in the instant case 
furnishes a greater degree of probative value of its true market value 
than that of the so-called "expert witnesses" who had to rely in large 
measure upon "comparable sales" in the areas some distance from the 
subject property. 
It is worthy to review the statement of this Court in the long 
recognized and highly regarded statement of law in the Gase of Salt Lake 
and U. R. P. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P.90, at 92, wherein it 
is stated: 
"If it is shown that the witness is competent to 
express an opinion as to values, no matter what the source of 
the qualifying information may be, he should be permitted to 
testify. The sources of the witnesses' information may vary 
according to the peculiar means or opportunity the witness has 
of forming an opinion and judging the premises. We do not 
think any good reason can be assigned why a person who has 
occupied and used the premises all her life, and has been 
interested and alert in making inquiry as to its value, may not 
be as well qualified to speak as the banker, lawyer, or real 
estate man, having more or less to do with the sales and 
transfers of real property. The means and extent of the knowl-
edge of any witness may be gone into on cross-examination, 
and rebutted by the testimony of other competent witnesses, 
whose opinions may differ as to value. No rule can be formulated 
for determining the means by which a witness shall acquire the 
necessary knowledge to qualify him to speak that will apply in 
all cases . If, under all the circumstances, he was in a position 
to obtain knowledge and form a correct judgment as to values, 
whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or using the property 
for purposes for which it is adaptable is immaterial, so long as 
the jury is given the benefit of the facts upon which the opinion 
of the witness is based. (Emphasis added). 
- 6 -
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Consis tent with the Schramm c a s e , sup ra . , we believe that 
the language set forth in the dissenting opinion in the instant c a s e , of 
Just ice Maughn merits reiteration and consideration by this Court. 
Just ice Maughn stated as follows: 
"In the instant act ion, defendant, Johnson, as owner 
of the property, was qualified to be an opinion w i t n e s s . His 
statement concerning his evaluation must be placed within the 
context of his other test imony. He had explained the uses to 
which the property had been devoted and the rental he had 
derived therefrom. His statement on cross-examira tion that 
his evaluation was based on what it was worth to him must be 
related to all his other test imony. Considered in this light, 
his evaluation testimony cannot be deemed of such a nature as 
to be inappropriate proof or incompetent evidence as to the fact 
in i s s u e . " 
This argument supports the position of the defendants in that 
two concepts presented on direct and cross-examination are not mutually 
exc lus ive . The cross and direct testimony must be looked at as a whole 
and the Court cannot ignore the competent and qualified testimony of the 
wi tness on direct examination. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the majority opinion has concluded that there was 
no substant ia l bas i s in the evidence to sustain the landowners'valuation 
- 7 -
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of his property. And in so finding the Court indulges in a fiction of 
isolating and focusing on an isolated question and answer illicited in 
cross-examination and thus totally disregarding an extensive, direct 
and re-direct examination on the issue of damages. In the recent case 
of Utah State Road Commission v. Sampson, (Utah, May 13, 1976), the 
landowner was permitted to testify concerning the value of his property 
which, as in the subject case, he had built, owned and operated for 
many years and in that case this Court stated that ". . . there is a 
substantial basis in the evidence to sustain the landowner's valuation 
of his property . . . " Although the Sampson case did not involve the 
question and answer as illicited in cross-examination in the instant case , 
this Court once again reaffirmed and acknowledged the right of the 
property owner to express his opinion of value and did not consider the 
same constituted error. 
We recognize the existence of authority which holds that it is 
improper for a landowner, who is otherwise qualified to express an opinion 
on value, to prediate his opinion upon the premise of what the property is 
worth to him. However, we believe that the testimony in the instant case , 
when reviewed in its entirety and as a whole, refutes the conclusion that 
- 8 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Mr. Johnson based his appraisal upon such a b a s i s . On direct 
examination, following extensive background testimony, he rendered an 
opinion of value a s set forth in the opinion of this Court . The re-direct 
examination of Mr. Johnson i l l ici ted the following signficant testimony: 
"Q . (By Mr. Wall) Mr. Johnson, counsel asked you 
if you were an expert , if you understood the concepts of 
apprais ing. You don't claim to be an expert , real es ta te 
appraiser , do you? 
A. No. 
k
 Q . But you are the property owner; aren' t you, or 
were? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Q . Do you think that over the 71 years you have lived 
you have acquired some knowledge of land value in Salt Lake 
County? 
A. I do . 
Q . Have you dwelled and relied upon that general know-
ledge and background in formulating your opinion of va lue? 
A. That is r ight. " 
We must consider that we are not here dealing with a sophiscated 
appraiser, skilled in the use of words of ar t , but rather a laymen, who in 
effect told the tr ial court and jury, that based on a total lifetime of 
experience (71) years), and an intimate knowledge with the construction, use 
- 9 -
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and occupancy of the subject property he did, in truth and in fact, have 
an opinion of its fair market value. This Court should not be persuaded 
to become involved in a technical play on words to defeat and set aside 
a jury verdict abundantly supported by competent probative evidence. 
In view of the foregoing authorities and argument we respectively 
submit that this Court should reverse its prior ruling and reaffirm and 
reinstate a Judgment on the Verdict entered by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Defendants. 
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